Kika-A | 18. 02. 2009, 15:27:43 | více příspěvků | napsat uživateli

neexistuje a ani nikdy nebude!1370!

uživatel eliminován | 18. 02. 2009, 15:26:19

Spravedlnost neexistuje !485!

uživatel eliminován | 2. 09. 2008, 22:49:37

zivot je na-!1192!a nespravedlivej!!!!!umiraj male deti a lide mladi-no hruza taky na zemi je peklo!!!!to vcem ted zijeme a jestli je raj nevim ztejne se to nedozvim ponevac budu za par let prdet do hliny tak co???!1075!!1075!!1075!

uživatel eliminován | 4. 08. 2008, 17:19:35

Sice jsem to nečetla, ale ne!!

cuclinka16 | 19. 07. 2008, 23:30:01 | více příspěvků | napsat uživateli

neexistuje protože je to moc dlouhý!

uživatel eliminován | 23. 05. 2008, 18:08:16

az budu mit par dni volna, tak si to prectu.. skroomnej slohacek :D !799!!799!

Jenny.Dee | 26. 01. 2008, 00:19:27 | více příspěvků | napsat uživateli

to jsou jen sracky, nic vic. spravedlnost neexistuje. nektery veci nejak jsou a tecka.

drzej_nafrnenej | 25. 01. 2008, 16:00:00 | více příspěvků | napsat uživateli

A number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the World Economic
Outlook. It has been assumed that real effective exchange rates will remain constant at their average
levels during August 22–September 19, 2007, except for the currencies participating in the European
exchange rate mechanism II (ERM II), which are assumed to remain constant in nominal terms
relative to the euro; that established policies of national authorities will be maintained (for specifi c
assumptions about fi scal and monetary policies in industrial countries, see Box A1); that the average
price of oil will be $68.52 a barrel in 2007 and $75.00 a barrel in 2008, and remain unchanged in real
terms over the medium term; that the six-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on U.S.
dollar deposits will average 5.2 percent in 2007 and 4.4 percent in 2008; that the three-month euro
deposits rate will average 4.0 percent in 2007 and 4.1 percent in 2008; and that the six-month Japanese
yen deposit rate will yield an average of 0.9 percent in 2007 and of 1.1 percent in 2008. These are, of
course, working hypotheses rather than forecasts, and the uncertainties surrounding them add to the
margin of error that would in any event be involved in the projections. The estimates and projections
are based on statistical information available through end-September 2007.
The following conventions have been used throughout the World Economic Outlook:
. . . to indicate that data are not available or not applicable;
— to indicate that the fi gure is zero or negligible;
– between years or months (for example, 2005–06 or January–June) to indicate the years or
months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months;
/ between years or months (for example, 2005/06) to indicate a fi scal or fi nancial year.
“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
“Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent
to ¼ of 1 percent point).
In fi gures and tables, shaded areas indicate IMF staff projections.
Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent fi gures and totals shown are due to rounding.
As used in this report, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a
state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial
entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent
basis.
ASSUMPTIONS AND CONVENTIONS
viii
This report on the World Economic Outlook is available in full on the IMF’s Internet site, www.imf.org.
Accompanying it on the website is a larger compilation of data from the WEO database than in the
report itself, consisting of fi les containing the series most frequently requested by readers. These fi les
may be downloaded for use in a variety of software packages.
The following changes have been made to streamline the Statistical Appendix of the World Economic
Outlook. Starting with this issue, the printed version of the World Economic Outlook will carry only Part A
Tables in the Statistical Appendix section.
Part A contains Tables 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 20, 25, 26, 31, 35, 43, and 44 from the previous issues of
the World Economic Outlook; Tables 1.2 and 1.3, which used to be in the main text of the report; and a
new table on private capital fl ows. Tables in Part A present summary data for both advanced economies
and emerging market and developing countries in the categories of Output, Infl ation, Financial Policies,
Foreign Trade, Current Account Transactions, Balance of Payments and External Financing, Flow
of Funds, and Medium-Term Baseline Scenario.
Part B of the Statistical Appendix contains the remaining tables. The complete Statistical Appendix,
which includes both Part A and Part B Tables, will be available only via the Internet at www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/index.htm.
Inquiries about the content of the World Economic Outlook and the WEO database should be sent by
mail, electronic mail, or telefax (telephone inquiries cannot be accepted) to:
World Economic Studies Division
Research Department
International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A.
E-mail: weo@imf.org Telefax: (202) 623-6343
FURTHER INFORMATION AND DATA
ix
x
The analysis and projections contained in the World Economic Outlook are integral elements of the
IMF’s surveillance of economic developments and policies in its member countries, of developments
in international fi nancial markets, and of the global economic system. The survey of prospects and
policies is the product of a comprehensive interdepartmental review of world economic developments,
which draws primarily on information the IMF staff gathers through its consultations with member
countries. These consultations are carried out in particular by the IMF’s area departments together
with the Policy Development and Review Department, the Monetary and Capital Markets Department,
and the Fiscal Affairs Department.
The analysis in this report has been coordinated in the Research Department under the general
direction of Simon Johnson, Economic Counsellor and Director of Research. The project has been
directed by Charles Collyns, Deputy Director of the Research Department, and Tim Callen, Division
Chief, Research Department.
The primary contributors to this report are Roberto Cardarelli, Kevin Cheng, Selim Elekdag,
Florence Jaumotte, Ben Jones, Michael Keen, Ayhan Kose, Toh Kuan, Subir Lall, Valerie Mercer-
Blackman, John Norregaard, Chris Papageorgiou, Hossein Samiei, Alasdair Scott, Martin Sommer,
Nikola Spatafora, Jon Strand, Natalia Tamirisa, and Petia Topalova. Sergei Antoshin, Gavin Asdorian,
To-Nhu Dao, Stephanie Denis, Nese Erbil, Angela Espiritu, Patrick Hettinger, Susana Mursula,
Murad Omoev, Allen Stack, Bennett Sutton, and Ercument Tulun provided research assistance.
Mahnaz Hemmati, Laurent Meister, and Emory Oakes managed the database and the computer
systems. Sylvia Brescia, Celia Burns, Jemille Colon, and Sheila Tomilloso Igcasenza were responsible
for word processing. Other contributors include Andrew Benito, Luis Catão, Gianni De Nicolò,
Hamid Faruqee, Thomas Helbling, Michael Kumhof, Tim Lane, Douglas Laxton, Gian-Maria Milesi-Fer
retti, Emil Stavrev, Thierry Tressel, and Johannes Wiegand. External consultants include Nancy Birdsall,
Menzie Chin, Gordon Hanson, Massimiliano Marcellino, and Carlos Végh. Archana Kumar of the
External Relations Department edited the manuscript and coordinated the production of the
publication.
The analysis has benefi ted from comments and suggestions by staff from other IMF departments, as
well as by Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on September 17 and 24, 2007.
However, both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be
attributed to Executive Directors or to their national authorities.
PREFACE
Throughout a turbulent summer, the World Economic
Outlook team at the IMF has worked hard to stay
ahead of developments, to refi ne our analytical work,
and to keep our forecasts up to date. Led by Charles
Collyns and Tim Callen, the World Economic Studies
division has worked closely with other IMF staff to produce
a WEO that is close to current developments while
providing some much-needed longer-term perspective.
We hope that it will help you both understand what has
happened in the past few months as well as refl ect on
what might be in store for the next 15 months.
The world economy has entered an uncertain
and potentially diffi cult period. The
fi nancial turmoil of August and September
threatens to derail what has been an excellent
half-decade of global growth. The problems
in credit markets have been severe, and while
the fi rst phase is now over, we are still waiting to
see exactly how the consequences will play out.
Still, the situation at present is one with
threats rather than actual major negative outcomes
on macroeconomic aggregates. At this
point, we expect global growth to slow in 2008,
but remain at a buoyant pace. Growth in the
United States is expected to remain subdued.
Problems in the housing sector are more intense
than previously expected, and the disruption
of credit is likely to have further impact. We
expect some slowing in Japan, where the second
quarter was disappointing, and in Europe, where
banks were involved to a surprising degree with
instruments and vehicles exposed to the U.S.
subprime sector.
The good news is that emerging market and
developing countries weathered the recent
fi nancial storm and are providing the basis
for strong global growth in 2008. For the fi rst
time, China and India are making the largest
country-level contributions to world growth (in
purchasing-power-parity terms; see the fi gure).
China is also making the largest contribution at
FOREWORD
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Emerging Markets Now the Major Engine of Global Growth
(Percent of world growth)
2006
2007
Contributions to Real GDP Growth
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Based on PPP Weights
China India United
States
Euro
area
Russia Japan Brazil
Based on Market Weights
United China India
States
Euro
area
Japan United Russia
Kingdom
2006
2007
xi
market prices. More generally, emerging market
and developing countries are reaping the benefi
ts of careful macroeconomic management over
the past decade. While there are some potential
vulnerabilities, and there is no room for complacency
going forward, emerging markets should
remain strong in the foreseeable future.
In terms of global risks, we see most of these
as being on the downside for growth, that is,
unexpected developments are more likely to
push growth down rather than push it up.
Our growth fan chart shows probabilities both
above and below our forecast, based on our
previous forecast errors, but the skewness of
the chart—based on our reading of what could
push the global economy away from our central
forecast—is almost entirely to the downside.
Some of these risks have received considerable
attention, including those in housing
markets and fi nancial sectors. But some are
more surprising, including the fact that oil
prices remain high and that sharp food price
increases are contributing to infl ation concerns
in emerging market and developing countries.
A key unknown is what will happen in Europe.
Until the events of this summer, Europe was in
the upswing of its cycle, with Germany in particular
emerging as a driver of growth, moving
beyond the long, diffi cult process of reunifi cation.
But the serious disruptions in the market
for interbank liquidity and the diffi culties
experienced by some European banks in recent
months were largely unexpected. Quite how
these developments will affect the real economy
remains to be seen.
I would also stress that the implications for
global imbalances remain uncertain. It seems
likely that the U.S. current account defi cit will
decline relative to GDP, in part because the dollar
has depreciated further since the summer—
its value is down more than 20 percent from
its recent peak in 2002. Fortunately, we have in
place a framework for cooperative actions by
the key countries involved with imbalances; this
was a major outcome of the IMF’s Multilateral
Consultation this year. Oil producers continue
to scale up their spending on infrastructure
and investments. China remains determined to
rebalance its demand so as to lower its current
account surplus. Europe and Japan continue
with the process of structural reform, which
should help with restructuring and boost domestic
demand. We expect that this framework will
facilitate the gradual decline of imbalances and
reduce risks of disruptive changes in exchange
rates, but this situation requires continued careful
attention.
Turning to our analytical chapters, Chapter 3
highlights a major challenge for many emerging
market and developing countries—how to manage
large capital infl ows. These infl ows slowed
this summer, but recent indications are that they
are again picking up. The chapter assesses what
we can learn from recent episodes of capital
infl ows around the world, and it looks at what
kinds of macroeconomic policies help to ensure
that growth post-infl ows remains strong. It turns
out that intervening in exchange markets, either
with or without sterilization, has not been successful
in limiting real exchange rate appreciation
or avoiding a deceleration in post-infl ow
growth. What really helps is being careful with
fi scal spending. The lesson here is not that a
country needs to cut spending when there are
infl ows, but rather that it needs to exercise fi scal
restraint. The greater caution of some leading
emerging markets in this regard since the late
1990s is commendable and has defi nitely contributed
in part to their resilience today. I hope
other countries will learn the same lesson.
Chapter 4 takes a longer-term perspective
and looks at what has happened to inequality
around the world, particularly during the
recent surge in various forms of globalization.
While we have written extensively, including in
the April 2007 World Economic Outlook, about
the benefi ts of globalization, the fi ndings in
this chapter should be seen as more cautionary.
In almost all countries, inequality has
increased in recent years. The authors fi nd that
increased trade is not the culprit. Rather, it
seems likely that the spread of new technology
around the world, both in general and through
foreign direct investment, has disproportion-
FOREWORD
xii
FOREWORD
xiii
ately benefi ted people who are better educated.
The implication, of course, is not to try to
prevent the adoption of new technology—such
an approach would be sure to derail growth.
Rather the policy objective should be to provide
the education and other social services (such as
affordable health care, a reasonable-cost pension
system, and so on) to ensure that as many
people as possible can fi nd and keep highproductivity
jobs. It would be unwise to ignore
the issue of growing inequality; globalization is
a key source of rising world prosperity, but more
effective policy actions are needed to make sure
that these benefi ts are well shared.
Chapter 5 offers hope but also some caution
regarding the longer-term prospects of the
global economy. Looking back as far as possible
with comparable data (which takes us to around
1960), it is clear that the past half-decade has
seen the strongest and most broadly based run
of global growth since the 1960s. This was not a
fl uke, but rather the result of improved frameworks
for both monetary and fi scal policies, as
well as serious institutional improvements in
many middle- and lower-income countries. At
the same time, there was some luck involved—
infl ation has been low, globally, in part because
of low-cost manufactured goods (part of the
globalization process) and because private capital
fl ows have been relatively stable. It would be
unwise to expect that there will not be shocks
going forward, and the chapter makes recommendations
that should help ensure that these
shocks do not have major repercussions.
In sum, the main message of this World
Economic Outlook is that, as long as policy fundamentals
remain strong and institutions are
not undermined, the global economy should
grow rapidly, with the continued involvement
of almost all countries. Events of the past few
months have been a major test of global fi nancial
stability, and some unexpected weaknesses
have emerged. As long as those remain contained
within a few industrial countries and are
addressed in a timely fashion, the impact on
world growth should be small.
The key, in the years ahead, is to make sure
that emerging market and developing countries
can continue to grow rapidly and without
major disruptions. Macroeconomic stability
is necessary but not suffi cient for economic
growth. We have to continue the process of
trade liberalization, allow capital to fl ow to
more productive opportunities in poorer countries,
and—most important—make sure that
the benefi ts of growth are widely shared across
all countries and by as many people as possible
within countries. We would do well to anticipate
further serious shocks, both downside and
upside, and to work harder to make sure that
the policies and institutions in place can withstand
these shocks.
Simon Johnson
Economic Counsellor and Director, Research Department
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The global economy grew strongly in the fi rst half
of 2007, although turbulence in fi nancial markets has
clouded prospects. While the 2007 forecast has been
little affected, the baseline projection for 2008 global
growth has been reduced by almost ½ percentage point
relative to the July 2007 World Economic Outlook
Update. This would still leave global growth at a
solid 4¾ percent, supported by generally sound fundamentals
and strong momentum in emerging market
economies. Risks to the outlook, however, are fi rmly on
the downside, centered around the concern that fi nancial
market strains could deepen and trigger a more
pronounced global slowdown. Thus, the immediate
focus of policymakers is to restore more normal fi nancial
market conditions and safeguard the expansion.
Additional risks to the outlook include potential infl ation
pressures, volatile oil markets, and the impact on
emerging markets of strong foreign exchange infl ows.
At the same time, longer-term issues such as population
aging, increasing resistance to globalization, and
global warming are a source of concern.
Global Economic Environment
The global economy continued to expand
vigorously in the fi rst half of 2007, with growth
running above 5 percent (Chapter 1). China’s
economy gained further momentum, growing
by 11½ percent, while India and Russia continued
to grow very strongly. These three countries
alone have accounted for one-half of global
growth over the past year. Robust expansions
also continued in other emerging market and
developing countries, including low-income
countries in Africa. Among the advanced economies,
growth in the euro area and Japan slowed
in the second quarter of 2007 after two quarters
of strong gains. In the United States, growth
averaged 2!/4 percent in the fi rst half of 2007 as
the housing downturn continued to apply considerable
drag.
Infl ation has been contained in the advanced
economies, but it has risen in many emerging
market and developing countries, refl ecting
higher energy and food prices. In the United
States, core infl ation has gradually eased to
below 2 percent. In the euro area, infl ation has
generally remained below 2 percent this year,
but energy and food price increases contributed
to an uptick in September; while in Japan,
prices have essentially been fl at. Some emerging
market and developing countries have seen
more infl ation pressures, refl ecting strong
growth and the greater weight of rising food
prices in their consumer price indices. The
acceleration in food prices has refl ected pressure
from the rising use of corn and other food
items for biofuel production and poor weather
conditions in some countries (Appendix 1.1).
Strong demand has kept oil and other commodity
prices high.
Financial market conditions have become
more volatile. As discussed in the October
2007 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR),
credit conditions have tightened as increasing
concerns about the fallout from strains
in the U.S. subprime mortgage market led to
a spike in yields on securities collateralized
with such loans as well as other higher-risk
securities. Uncertainty about the distribution
of losses and rising concerns about counterparty
risk saw liquidity dry up in segments of
the fi nancial markets. Equity markets initially
retreated, led by falling valuations of fi nancial
institutions, although prices have since recovered,
and long-term government bond yields
declined as investors looked for safe havens.
Emerging markets have also been affected,
although by relatively less than in previous
episodes of global fi nancial market turbulence,
and asset prices remain high by historical
standards.
xiv

uživatel eliminován | 25. 01. 2008, 15:57:12

!1195!dědo di si lehnout!1195!

uživatel eliminován | 25. 01. 2008, 15:56:17

z jaké seš sekty?

uživatel eliminován | 25. 01. 2008, 15:55:27

Zlo opravdu existuje. A my za to musíme být vděční. Zlo je ten největší dar, jaký můžeme dát sami sobě. Přemýšlejte o této láskyplné myšlence: zlo neoplácejte zlem a ani zlo neodsuzujte. Raději zlu žehnejte a považujte je za nejlepší příležitost, za jedinou příležitost, kterou v tomto životě máme, abychom jsme mohli prožívat to, čím opravdu jsme.

Nikdy a nic neodsuzuji, pouze všechno pozoruji. Nic jiného nedělám. Jakmile se rozhodnu, čím jsem ve vztahu k tomu, co pozoruji, prostě to vyjádřím.

Někdy nejsem se svým rozhodnutím spokojen, takže příšte se rozhodnu jinak. Jsem-li se svým rozhodnutím spokojen, často je opakuji. Nikdy však neodsuzuji žádné situace, které mi daly příležitost být tím, čím opravdu jsem. Neboť vím, že v nepřítomnosti toho, čím nejsem, nemohu být tím, čím jsem. To znamená, že v nepřítomnosti zla (kterým nejsem) nemohu být dobrý (což jsem). Neboť žijeme v relativním světě, kde všechno existuje jako nástroj k vytváření toho, čím chceme být. To je Boží existence.

Takže ano, na světě opravdu existuje zlo. Jistě. Nepochybně. A děkujme Bohu, neboť bez zla bychom nebyli ničím. Kdyby nebyli nemoci, lékař by nemohl být lékařem. Kdyby nebyli mezi lidmi rozepře, advokát by nemohl být advokátem. Kdyby nekapal vodovodní kohoutek v kuchyni, instalatér by nemohl být instalatérem. Všichni jsme posvátní partneři. A proto nikdo nesmí nikoho odsuzovat. Neboť nevíme, jakou cestu si ta či ona posvátná duše zvolila a jaký úkol na sebe vzala. Je tu proto, aby byla naším přítelem, nebo naším nepřítelem? Naším pomocníkem, nebo naším pronásledovatelem? Až tohle pochopíme, pak odhalíme tajemství a smysl života. Pak budeme žehnat každému a všemu na tomto světě....

Neexistují ani oběti, ani zločinci. Lidé se nerozdělují na "dobré" a "špatné". Bůh stvořil pouze dokonalost. Každá duše je dokonalá, čistá a krásná. Ve stavu zapomnětlivosti, v němž žijí tady na Zemi, mohou tyto dokonalé bytosti dělat nedokonalé věci - nebo to, čemu říkáme nedokonalé věci - a přece všechno, co se v životě děje, má svůj dokonalý důvod. V Božím světě neexistují chyby a nic se neděje náhodou.... A nikdy k tobě žádný člověk nepřijde bez daru v ruce....

Výborně. To je velmi dobré a přesto je to pro mnoho lidí velmi těžko pochopitelné...

Časem se všechno vyjastní. Lidé, kteří hledají poznání, nakonec tuto pravdu pochopí...

Neexistuje nic takového jako "správný" a "špatný". Existuje pouze to, co nám slouží a co nám neslouží, a to závisí na tom, čím se snažíš být, co chceš dělat nebo mít....

Yuanjia | 25. 01. 2008, 15:45:31 | více příspěvků | napsat uživateli

PS jo spravedlnost existuje, i když je těžký jí někdy vidět v tom co se kde semele : )) obzvlášť když si někdy dá načas : ))

Yuanjia | 25. 01. 2008, 15:41:00 | více příspěvků | napsat uživateli

každý má co si zaslouží... !190!

Stal jsem se moudrým nebo jsem jenom přízemně zvědavej?

uživatel eliminován | 25. 01. 2008, 15:26:26

nečtůů !231!!811!

uživatel eliminován | 25. 01. 2008, 15:23:16

to je loupáček....Víš zkrať to....Pak tě možná jednou nikdo pochopí!958!